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In August–October, Ukraine may be unable to supply around 9 million tonnes of agricultural products to international markets due to a sharp reduction in available export capacity. The largest shortfalls are expected during the first months of logistical adjustment: approximately 2.9 million tonnes in August, 2.8 million tonnes in September, and 3.3 million tonnes in October.

The key problem is that alternative routes cannot quickly replace full-scale maritime exports. Danube ports remain dependent on water levels and available vessel draft; rail exports are constrained by border crossing capacity and transshipment infrastructure, while road transport, due to its high cost, cannot handle cargo volumes on a comparable scale. At the same time, August–October is the period when the new harvest actively enters the market, traditionally creating one of the highest demands for export logistics.

Grains, primarily wheat and corn, will account for the largest share of the volumes that cannot be exported. Some oilseeds can be redirected to western border crossings more quickly, but this will not offset the overall shortage of transportation capacity.

The financial impact of the delays will also be significant. Under a conservative price scenario, deferred export earnings in August–October could amount to around $1.9 billion. Under a scenario of higher export prices, the potential volume of deferred revenues could approach $2.8 billion.

These amounts should not be interpreted as entirely irreversible losses: some products may be exported later once alternative routes increase their capacity. However, even a delay of several months means lower foreign-currency revenues for Ukraine’s agricultural sector, growing stocks, additional pressure on domestic prices, higher logistics and storage costs, and worsening liquidity for producers.

For global markets, a reduction of around 9 million tonnes of Ukrainian agricultural products would mean a temporary decline in supply from the Black Sea region and a need to partially replace these volumes with supplies from other countries. This could intensify competition for available grain and provide additional support to global prices, particularly if restrictions on Ukrainian exports persist.

The greatest risk lies in the duration of the logistical shock. If alternative routes can be expanded quickly, a significant share of exports will simply be postponed to subsequent months. If the restrictions persist for longer, the problem will gradually shift from deferred revenues to direct economic losses due to lower domestic prices, rising costs, and a deterioration in the financial condition of agricultural producers.